Florida Law Review
Volume 41

Issue 4

Article 3

September 1989

Customer Deposits: Tax-Free Security or Prepaid Income?
Loren D. Prescott

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Loren D. Prescott, Customer Deposits: Tax-Free Security or Prepaid Income?, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 773 (1989).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss4/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Prescott: Customer Deposits: Tax-Free Security or Prepaid Income?

CUSTOMER DEPOSITS:
TAX-FREE SECURITY OR PREPAID INCOME?
Loren D. Prescott, Jr.*
I.

II.

INTRODUCTION

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ...................

A.
B.
III.

The Utility Deposit Cases ...................
The Rental Deposit Cases ...................

774

774
782
787

The PrimaryPurpose Test ..................
The Facts and Circumstances Test ...........

788
793

1. Interest ......
.....................
2. Consistent Treatment for Tax and Accounting
.
..............
Purposes ..........
3. Obligation to Account for Deposit .............
4. Unrestricted Use and Control ................
5. Other Factors ...........................

794
795
796
796
797

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES AND A PROPOSED

SOLUTION ...............................

A.
B.
C.
D.
V.

773

AN EVALUATION OF THE PRIMARY PURPOSE AND
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES TESTS ..............

A.
B.

IV.

...........................

Claim-of-Right Doctrine ....................
Deposits and the Obligation to Repay .........
Economic-Benefit Doctrine ..................
A Proposed Solution ......................

CONCLUSION .............................
I.

798
799
800
804
808

812

INTRODUCTION

Deposits made by lessees or customers in connection with the future use of property or the receipt of services are commonplace, but
their use is not without some tax risk. Although the term "deposit"
suggests that monies have been received subject to an offsetting obligation to repay, and therefore, are not included in the recipient's
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income, such payments often exhibit many of the characteristics associated with prepaid income. Courts have struggled with the definition of gross income since the early days of the federal income tax,
but they have yet to develop a clear test for determining if and when
recipients must include such deposits in gross income.
A split of authority has developed between the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits regarding the tax treatment of customer deposits
received by utility companies as security for the payment of future
utility bills. In City Gas Co. of Floridav. Commissioner,Ithe Eleventh
Circuit required the application of a test which the Tax Court used
on remand to require inclusion of deposits in income on receipt. 2 On
similar facts, the Seventh Circuit in IndianapolisPower & Light Co.
v. Commissioner3 reached the opposite conclusion. These disparate
results prompted the Supreme Court to grant the government's petition for writ of certiorari in Indianapolis Power & Light.4 With the
Supreme Court's decision to hear this case comes renewed debate
over the tax treatment of customer deposits.
This article first discusses the decisions in City Gas and Indianapolis Power & Light. The body of case law dealing with the
taxation of rental deposits is then reviewed to set the stage for an
analysis and comparison of the City Gas and IndianapolisPower &
Light decisions. Finally, this article explores the concept of gross
income in connection with the receipt of customer deposits and offers
alternative analytical approaches for characterizing deposits as either
prepaid income or nontaxable security deposits in an attempt to provide a logical means of treating customer deposits for federal income
tax purposes.
II.

A.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Utility Deposit Cases

Confusion over the proper characterization of utility customer deposits for tax purposes began with the Tax Court's decision in City
Gas.5 City Gas involved a regulated public utility company, City Gas
Company of Florida, and its two unregulated subsidiaries, Dade Gas
Company and Dri-Gas Corporation. 6 All three companies were accrual-

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

689 F.2d 943 (lth Cir. 1982).
Id. at 943.
857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1929 (1989).
Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 109 S. Ct. 1929 (1989).
City Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 386 (1980), rev'd, 689 F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1982).

6.

Id. at 367.
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method taxpayers engaged in the business of selling natural gas or
propane to residential and commercial customers. 7 The companies required their customers to make a cash deposit to establish a new
account. 8 The receipt issued by each company stated that the company
held the deposit to secure payment of all bills for services rendered
to the customer.9 The receipt also indicated that upon termination of
service or prior election by the company, the deposit would be returned
to the customer after deducting any amounts then owed to the company. Each of the companies followed the same procedure when a
customer terminated service: the final bill was prepared, the customer's deposit was applied against the balance due, and any excess
was refunded to the customer. 0 If a balance due existed after application of the deposit, the companies sent a bill for the difference to the
customer for payment.1 Unclaimed deposits eventually escheated to
12
the State of Florida.
The Florida Public Service Commission required regulated public
utilities to pay interest on customer deposits.13 City Gas paid interest
at the minimum prescribed rate of four percent. 14 The two unregulated
subsidiaries chose not to pay interest on deposits.5 Customer deposits
held by each of the companies were not physically segregated from
general operating funds, and the companies' use of these funds was
not restricted. 6
In accordance with its system of accounting,17 City Gas treated
customer deposits as current liabilities for financial reporting purposes.' 8 Dade Gas and Dri-Gas also reported deposits received as current liabilities. 9 All three companies treated customer deposits as
liabilities for federal income tax purposes.20 The Internal Revenue
Service challenged the treatment of customer deposits as current

7. Id.
8. Id. at 388.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 389.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 389.
13. Id. at 388.
14. Id. at 389.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. As a regulated utility, City Gas was prescribed to use the National Association of
Regulatory Commissioners Uniform System of Accounts. Id. at 388.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 389.
20. Id.
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liabilities, arguing that the deposits represented advance payments
required to be included in gross income on receipt.21
In its initial opinion, the Tax Court reviewed "the totality of the
facts and circumstances" and concluded that the customer payments
were nontaxable security deposits. 22 The court focused on the taxpayers' acknowledged obligation to account for each customer's deposit, an obligation which the court concluded could only be satisfied
by refunding the deposit or applying it to the customer's unpaid bill.2
The court also cited treatment of customer deposits as liabilities for
tax and financial reporting purposes, payment of interest on customer
deposits, and escheat of unclaimed deposits to the state as factors
supporting its decision. 24
A series of rental deposit cases cited by the Service in support of
its position failed to persuade the court that City Gas and its subsidiaries should include customer deposits in income upon receipt.2
The court distinguished this line of cases by noting that in each, the
taxpayer's right to apply deposits against the lessee's fixed future
rent obligation - a right which the courts likened to unrestricted
control over deposits received - justified the decision to require immediate inclusion in income.s Given the companies' inability to determine in advance the amount of a customer's final bill, the court concluded that City Gas and its subsidiaries did not have the right to
apply customer deposits in payment of fixed future obligations and,
therefore, did not have the unrestricted control over deposits necessary to justify immediate inclusion in gross income.-On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court decision.2
The court began its review of the case by noting that gross income
includes payments received for goods, services or other income items
if the recipient has a present right to such payments and has complete

21. Id. at 390.
22. Id. at 391. The court reached this conclusion only after initially noting that tax-free
treatment of security deposits was an exception to the general rule requiring inclusion in gross
income of "[a]dvance payments to which a taxpayer recipient has a present right, and over
which he has unrestricted control .

general
at 945.
23.
24.
25.
text.
26.
27.
28.

. . ."

Id. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit relied on this

rule to reverse the decision of the Tax Court in City Gas. See City Gas Co., 689 F.2d
City Gas, 74 T.C. at 392.
Id. at 392-93.
For a discussion of these rental deposit cases, see infra notes 74-124 and accompanying
City Gas, 74 T.C. at 392.
Id.
City Gas Co., 689 F.2d at 943.
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and unrestricted control over their use and disposition. 29 The court
then compared the tax treatment of these "advance payments" to the
tax-free status of refundable "security deposits" offered to secure property against loss or damage or to secure the performance of conditions
or other nonincome-producing covenants of a contract.2 0 Based on its
review of these two rules, the court concluded that customer deposits
received by City Gas and its subsidiaries would be considered taxable
advance payments if the companies held the sums deposited as security
for the payment of income items rather than as security for the performance of nonincome-producing covenants.3 1 Recognizing that many
deposits would have a mixed purpose, the Court concluded, "the test
to be applied in this case is whether, under all the circumstances, the
primary purpose of the payments at issue was a prepayment of income
items, or whether the primary purpose was to secure the performance
of nonincome-producing covenants."' 2
The Eleventh Circuit criticized the Tax Court for basing its decision
in part on the taxpayer's consistent treatment of customer deposits
for tax and financial reporting purposes. 3 It also challenged the lower
court's conclusion that the rental deposit cases cited by the Commissioner could not be applied to utility deposit cases in the absence of
an obligation to make a fixed future payment.3 The Eleventh Circuit
remanded the case to the Tax Court with instructions to apply the
"primary purpose test."-,

29. Id. at 945.
30. Id. at 946.
31. Id. Before framing the issue, the court observed that two of the three requirements
necessary for treatment of the deposits as an advance payment - a present right to income
and unrestricted control over the amounts received - had been met. Id. While the taxpayers'
level of control over customer deposits was undisputed, City Gas did challenge the government's
position that the utilities had a present right to income upon receipt of a deposit. In footnote
10 of the opinion, the court concluded that as soon as the gas was turned on, the customer had
an obligation to pay, and this obligation left the taxpayers with a "continuing 'present right'
to income. Id. at 950 n.10.
32. Id. at 948.
33. Id. at 949' The court noted that a method of accounting imposed by a regulatory agency
will not be respected for tax purposes if it does not result in a clear reflection of income. Id.
(citing Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 15 (1974)). For a discussion of the
significance of a taxpayer's method of accounting, see infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
34. City Gas Co., 689 F.2d at 949. The Eleventh Circuit took the position that the rental
cases cited by the Commissioner were premised on the theory that a deposit is taxable if its
purpose is to prepay rent. Since no fixed future payment would be required under this approach,
the court concluded that the Tax Court's concern over its inability to determine at the outset
the taxpayer's interest in the deposit was misplaced. Id. at 949.
35. Id. at 950.
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On remand, the Tax Court found that, in most cases, the companies
expected and intended to evantually apply the deposits to charges
for gas consumed by the customer.36 Because the most significant
charge on a customer's final bill was for gas consumed, and because
the companies usually applied the deposits against the customer's final
bill, the Tax Court held that the primary purpose of each deposit was
to act as a prepayment of the customer's final gas bil. Having determined that these customer deposits were held as security for the
future payment of income items, the Tax Court characterized them
as advance payments and required the taxpayers to include them in
income in the year of receipt.
IndianapolisPower & Light also involved the collection of customer
deposits by a regulated public utility. The taxpayer in Indianapolis
Power & Light was an accrual-method taxpayer engaged in the business of generating, transmitting, distributing, and selling electrical
energy.3 9 When a customer established a new account, the company
evaluated the customer's creditworthiness. 40 The company required
deposits of all customers who failed to meet its minimum credit standards. 41 Upon receiving a deposit, the company issued a receipt stating
that it would hold the deposit to ensure prompt payment of the customer's bills and that the deposit would be refunded after service had
been disconnected and all bills had been paid.4 In practice, the company usually credited the customer's final bill with the amount of the
43
deposit.
The company also refunded customer deposits at the request of
any customer who could meet the company's creditworthiness standards at the time of the request." When faced with such a refund

36. City Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 971, 973 (1984).

37. Id.
38. Id. In response to the taxpayers' argument that their primary purpose was not to
collect advance payments btt to minimize' collection losses and provide security for accounts
receivable, the Tax Court concluded that if the prepayments were not categorized as security
for the performance of nonincome-producing covenants, they would fall within the only other
category announced by the appeals court and would be taxable: "The Eleventh Circuit, as we
understand it, did not admit of the possibility of other categories." Id. (citing City Gas Co.,
689 F.2d at 948 n.7). For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's footnote 7, see infranote 143.
39. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 964, 965 (1987), affd, 857
F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1929 (1989).
40. Id. at 966.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 968.
44. Id. at 967.
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request, the company asked the customer how the deposit should be
refunded. Most customers requested a cash refund, but occasionally
the company was asked to apply the deposit as a credit to the customer's utility bill. 45 A subsequent amendment to the rules issued by
the Public Service Commission of Indiana required regulated public
utilities to refund a customer's deposit automatically after a review
of the customer's recent payment history had established that customer's creditworthiness.46 Indianapolis Power & Light, a regulated
public utility, complied with this rule and issued refunds accordingly.
Customers continued to determine the manner in which they received
47
refunds under this new procedure.
The Public Service Commission of Indiana required Indianapolis
Power & Light to adopt a standardized method of accounting for
financial reporting purposes.4 Consistent with that method of account49
ing, the company treated customer deposits as current liabilities.
The company also treated deposits as current liabilities for federal
income tax purposes. 5° Additionally, the Commission required the company to pay interest at the rate of six percent on customer deposits
held more than one year.r1 The company did not physically segregate
customer deposits from general operating funds, nor was its use of
the funds restricted. 2 Unclaimed deposits ultimately escheated to the
State of Indiana.
In a unanimous reviewed decision, the Tax Court rejected the
Eleventh Circuit's "primary purpose" test and the applicability of the
rental deposit cases cited in support of the Eleventh Circuit's approach
and instead chose to focus on the rights retained by the depositor and
those acquired by the holder of the deposit through an examination
of all the facts and circumstances.53
The court first noted that only five percent of the company's customers actually were required to post deposits, a fact which suggested
that the company's objective was not to maximize prepaid income

45. Id.
46. Id. at 967-68. Specifically, the amended rules required the company to refund residential
customer deposits after the customer made satisfactory payments during a period of nine consecutive months or in any ten months falling within a twelve-month period. Id.
47. Id. at 968.
48. Id. at 969.
49. Id. at 968.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 967.
52. Id. at 968.
53. Id. at 976.
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through the use of deposits.- The court also observed that depositors
retained substantial control over the ultimate disposition of their deposits and that the company could use a customer's deposit only when
utility bills were not paid. 5 Finally, the payment of interest on deposits
and the taxpayer's consistent treatment of deposits as liabilities, both
for income tax and financial reporting purposes, suggested that the
company had treated deposits as the property of its customers.5 These
facts convinced the Tax Court that the deposits received were not
intended as advance payments of income. The court concluded that
the company held customer deposits temporarily as security for the
did not require the
future payment of utility bills. Thus, the court
57
income.
in
deposits
such
include
to
company
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the Tax
Court in Indianapolis Power & Light.5 The court began its review
of the case by summarizing the Eleventh Circuit's approach in City
Gas.59 The Seventh Circuit agreed that the primary purpose test was
the most appropriate method of determining the tax treatment of
customer deposits, 6° but refused to fully endorse the Eleventh Circuit's
application of the primary purpose test in City Gas.6' After criticizing
the Eleventh Circuit for limiting the scope of tax-free security deposits
to payments held as security for nonincome-producing covenants, the
court concluded that application of the primary purpose test need not
always result in the taxation of deposits held to secure the future
payment of income itemsA2 The Seventh Circuit held that an examination of all the facts and circumstances was necessary to determine
whether the primary purpose of such a deposit was to prepay income
or to secure the future payment of income.
One of the factors explored by the Seventh Circuit was the payment
of interest by Indianapolis Power & Light. The court began by observing that, historically, advance payments of income had been included
in income upon receipt because the recipient was entitled to use the

54. Id. at 976-77.
55. Id. at 977.
56. Id. at 978.
57. Id.
58. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 1929 (1989).
59. Id. at 1164-65.
60. Id. at 1167.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1170.
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payment as its own.64 The court then divided a recipient's "use" of a
prepayment into two categories: use of the funds to earn a return and
use of the funds to minimize future costs incurred on customer default. 4 While a recipient would generally enjoy benefits from both
"uses," the court suggested that payment of interest on deposits would
at least partially offset any benefit derived from the taxpayer's investment of the funds received, leaving the taxpayer with a deposit it
could "use" only to minimize future costs incurred on customer default
(i.e. a deposit held to secure payment of future bills).The Seventh Circuit's modification of the primary purpose test,
together with its position on the significance of interest payments,
had the effect of creating a second category of tax-free deposits: interest-bearing deposits held as security for the future payment of
utility bills. 67 The court justified its creation of this additional class of
deposits by distinguishing deposits on which the holder pays interest
from the typical advance payment; only the latter could be invested
and bring a return without diminution through the payment of interest.6 9 According to the court, this difference justified tax-free treatment for deposits on which interest was paid.69
The Seventh Circuit's review of the facts in Indianapolis Power
& Light prompted it to conclude that the company held deposits received from customers primarily as security and that, therefore, these
deposits should be treated as nontaxable security deposits. 70 The
court based its conclusion primarily on the company's payment of
interest on deposits and on the fact that customers retained control
over the timing and manner of deposit refunds.71
Although the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits agree that use of the
primary purpose test is appropriate in characterizing a deposit received
by a utility company, a dispute remains over how to classify such a
deposit when the utility holds it primarily to secure the future payment
of an item of income. In City Gas, the Eleventh Circuit held that only
deposits held to secure property against damage or held to secure
nonincome-producing covenants would receive tax-free treatment.72

64.

Id. at 1168 (citing Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943)).

65. Id.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 1168-69.
See id. at 1169.
See id.
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1170.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 28-38.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

9

Florida
Law Review,
Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1989], Art. 3
LAW REVIEW
FLORIDA

[Vol. 41

The Seventh Circuit rejected this narrow approach in Indianapolis
Power & Light and instead chose to evaluate the facts and circumstances of each case and, when appropriate, permit the exclusion
from gross income of deposits held primarily to secure income items.73
As these cases were the first to address the tax treatment of
deposits received by utility companies, the Tax Court and both circuit
courts were forced to rely on a body of case law dealing with deposits
made by tenants in connection with the leasing of property. Consequently, an analysis of the decisions in City Gas and Indianapolis
Power & Light must begin with a review of these landlord-tenant
cases.
B.

The Rental Deposit Cases

One of the first cases to consider a deposit held as security for the
payment of rent was Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner.4
The taxpayer in Clinton received a deposit equal to one year's rent
which he agreed to hold during the lease term to ensure the payment
of rent and the performance of all lease covenants by the lessee.7
These lease covenants included a requirement that the lessee maintain
the premises in good condition and that all personal property damaged
by the lessee be repaired or replaced: According to the lease, the
landlord would apply the deposit toward payment of the last year's
rent if the lessee were not in default at that time.7 The lease required
the taxpayer to pay interest on the deposit each year27
The Fifth Circuit recognized that the lessee's payment could be
either a taxable advance payment of rent or a nontaxable security
deposit.7 9 For the payment to constitute a security deposit, the court
required that the payment be made and received as security and that

73.
74.

See supra text accompanying notes 58-71.
128 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942). Earlier cases permitted exclusion of deposits from income,

but in those cases, the recipient was not permitted to apply the funds received in payment of
future rent. See, e.g., Warren Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 723, 724 (2d Cir. 1940)
(discussed infra at notes 89-92 and accompanying text); Estate of Barker v. Commissioner, 13
B.T.A. 562, 567-68 (1928).
75. Clinton, 128 F.2d at 969.

76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. Although earlier cases considered the tax treatment of rental deposits, see supra
note 74, none stated the alternative tests as succinctly as the Fifth Circuit in Clinton. In fact,

the courts continue to use this basic test. The Eleventh Circuit made the only significant
modification, drawing a distinction between income and nonincome items in City Gas. See supra
text accompanying note 32.
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the recipient have no right or claim of ownership to the sums deposited. s ' The Fifth Circuit noted that it would be appropriate to treat
the payment as a security deposit even though the landlord might
eventually apply the deposit to the lessee's future rent obligation.8'
The court reviewed the lease agreement to ascertain the intentions
of the parties with regard to the purpose of the deposit and concluded
that the parties intended the lessee's deposit to be a nontaxable security deposit.Y Two facts influenced the court's conclusion: the taxpayer's payment of interest on the funds deposited and the possible
application of the deposit to many things other than rent. 3
One year later, the Fifth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in
Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner-4 In Astor Holding Co., the
taxpayer received $17,500 from the lessee at the inception of the lease
"as part payment of the tenth year's rent." The lease did not require
the tax payer to pay interest on the money received, nor did it indicate
whether the lessor held the money to ensure the payment of rent or
the performance of lease covenants 6 The court again reviewed the
lease agreement to determine the intended purpose of the payment
and concluded that language in the lease characterizing the payment
as prepaid rent, together with the absence of factors relied on by the
court in Clinton, 7 justified treatment of the money received as advance
rent taxable on receipt. 88
80. Clinton, 128 F.2d at 969.
81. Id. (citing Warren Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 723, 724 (2d Cir. 1940);
Estate of Barker v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 562, 568 (1928)). However, in those cases, deposits
could be applied to unpaid rent only in the event of default by the lessee. Thus, the Fifth
Circuit's conclusion in Clinton is much more than a mere restatement of the law.
82. Id. at 969-70.
83. See id. at 970.
84. 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943).
85. Id. at 48.
86. Id.
87. See supra text accompanying note 83.
88. Astor Holding Co., 135 F.2d at 48. While the Clinton court was not troubled by the
anticipated application of the deposit to the lessee's future rent obligation, the Astor Holding
Co. court may have been concerned by such an application, given its failure to include in its
statement of the law the following reference from Clinton: "[I]f . . . paid and received as
security, with no present right or claim of full ownership, it would not be presently income,
although it was expected finally to be applied in payment of the last year's rent if nothing
happened to prevent." Clinton, 128 F.2d at 969 (emphasis added); see also supra note 81 and
accompanying text (for a discussion of the anticipated application of a deposit to future rent in
Clinton). The absence of this language in the Astor Holding Co. opinion, while arguably unnecessary due to the facts of the case, apparently led the Second Circuit to conclude that the Fifth
Circuit no longer subscribed to the rule announced in Clinton. See Hirsch Improvement Co. v.
Commissioner, 143 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1944) (discussed infra at notes 93-100 and accompanying
text), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1945).
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The approach taken by the Second Circuit in early rental deposit
cases differed from that of the Fifth Circuit, but the results were
essentially the same. In Warren Service Corp. v. Commissioner,9 the
lessee offered a refundable deposit equal to the last year's rent as
security for the lessee's performance of all obligations under the lease.98
The lease did not permit the landlord to apply the deposit in payment
of the last year's rent. 91 The Second Circuit characterized the deposit
as a nontaxable security deposit because of the taxpayer's binding
obligation to refund the deposit at the conclusion of the lease.9
The Second Circuit again focused on the existence of an obligation
to repay in Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner.93 The taxpayer
in Hirsch Improvement held a deposit as security for the payment of
rent and the performance of lease covenants.9' The lease agreement
required the lessor to apply the deposit in payment of the last year's
rent if the tenant was not then in default. 95 Noting that the lease
agreement required a refund of the deposit only in the event the
leased premises were condemned or destroyed,6 the court held the
deposit taxable in the year of receipt.' The court reasoned that "the
sum received was to be repaid, in whole or part, under circumstances
which might never occur and of a kind so limited as to be insufficient
to require that sum to be categorized as primarily not intended as
rent."98 Rather than disagreeing with the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Clinton, which held for the taxpayer on similar facts, the court
suggested that the Fifth Circuit had qualified the Clinton decision in
Astor Holding Co.9 9 and likened the facts and result in HirschImprovement to those found in Astor Holding Co..Y°°

89. 110 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1940).
90. Id. at 724.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 724.
93. 143 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1945).
94. Id. at 913.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 915.
98. Id.
99. Although the Astor Holding Co. court restated the test previously announced in Clinton,
see supra note 88, a change in the Fifth Circuit's approach was not needed; the extreme facts
found in Astor Holding Co. were enough to distinguish it from the result in Clinton. Consequently, the Second Circuit's approach in Hirsch Improvement was more an attempt to develop
an independent standard than it was an acceptance of the Fifth Circuit's view in Clinton and
Astor Holding Co.
100. Hirsch Improvement, 143 F.2d at 915.
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The Tax Court first considered the tax treatment of rental deposits
in Gilken v. Commissioner.10 ' The taxpayer in Gilken received a sum
of money as a nonrefundable deposit to secure the performance of a
tenant's lease obligations. 10 2 The lease required the landlord to apply
the deposit to the last year's rent unless the lessee exercised its option
to purchase the property, in which case the landlord would apply the
deposit to the purchase price of the property. 10 In determining
whether the deposit was an advance payment of rent or a nontaxable
security deposit, the Tax Court chose to focus on the primary purpose
of the payment. 1 4 Relying on repeated references in the lease to the
deposit as "prepaid rent" and on the absence of an obligation to refund
the deposit, the Tax Court held that the parties intended the deposit
to act primarily as a prepayment of rent. 0 5 Based on this conclusion,
the court required the taxpayer to include the full amount of the
deposit in income in the year of receipt.1' 6 The presence of an option
to purchase did not alter the court's decision. 10 7 Rather, the court
assigned secondary importance to the tenant's option to purchase and
likened it to contingencies found in earlier cases 08 that other courts
had held insufficient to support a binding obligation to repay. °9
Four years after its decision in Gilken, the Tax Court again considered the tax treatment of a tenant's rental deposit in Mantell v.
Commissioner.10 The taxpayer held the deposit collected from the
lessee in Mantell as security for the lessee's performance of all lease

covenants."' The lease did not require the taxpayer to pay interest2
on the deposited funds or to place the deposit in a separate account.1
Of particular importance was a provision in the agreement prohibiting

101.
102.
103.
104.

10 T.C. 445 (1948), affd, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1949).
Id. at 446-47.
Id.
Id. at 453-54.

105.

See id. at 453.

106. Id. at 453.
107. Id. at 456.
108. Id. at 452 (citing Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 912, 915 (2d
Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1945); DeGolia v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 845, 848 (1939)).
109. Id. at 456. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Gilken by applying
the claim-of-right doctrine. See Gilken v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1949). For a
discussion of the claim-of-right doctrine and its application to deposit cases, see infra notes
181-89 and accompanying text.
110. 17 T.C. 1143 (1952).
111. Id. at 1145.
112. Id.
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the lessor from applying the deposit against unpaid rent.113 The Tax
Court applied the primary purpose test announced in Gilken and held
that the presence of a binding obligation to refund the deposit, together
with the prohibition against use of the funds to satisfy unpaid rent,
justified its decision to permit exclusion of the deposit from gross

income. 114
Finally, in J & E Enterprises v. Commissioner,11r the Tax Court
considered a situation in which a rental deposit secured only the lessee's obligation to pay rent. 116 Instead of applying the primary purpose
test, the court reviewed all the facts and circumstances surrounding
the taxpayer's receipt of the deposit. 1 7 The court observed that the
taxpayer had exclusive control over the manner in which the deposit
was either refunded or applied to rent and that the deposit only secured
the payment of rent and property taxes. 18 These factors convinced
the Tax Court that the parties intended the deposit to act as a prepayment of rent, and the court required the taxpayer to include the funds
received in income."19
While the conclusions reached in these rental deposit cases do not
adequately respond to the issues raised in City Gas and Indianapolis
Power & Light, they do provide a general framework within which to
evaluate deposits. The outer boundaries of this framework are established by Astor Holding Co."20 (which requires immediate taxation of

113. See id. at 114546.
114. Id. at 1148. The Commissioner argued that the deposit was actually prepaid rent
because deposit repayments coincided in time and amount with the lessee's obligation to pay
rent during the last months of the lease term. Id. The court rejected this argument:
We are, of course, aware of the relationship in time and amount between the
deposit repayment installments and the rent installments for the final period. However, we cannot conclude therefrom as does the respondent that the provision for
the repayment of the security deposit to the lessees lacked substance and was in
fact a provision for the prepayment of rent. Such an express provision cannot
easily be disregarded when, as here, the legal rights of the parties, and of third
parties also, may be substantially different depending on whether the clause provides that the deposit is to be returned to the lessees or applied to the rent of
the final period.

Id.
115. 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 944 (1967).
116. Id. at 945. The agreement permitted the landlord to pay delinquent property taxes
and to increase rent due by a like amount. Thus, the deposit actually secured the payment of
rent and property taxes. Id.
117. Id. at 946.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943).
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deposits offered as prepaid rent) and by Warren Servicel21 and Mantell'2 (both of which permit tax-free receipt of those deposits not
available for application against future rent). Courts characterize deposits which fall between these two extremes (for example, those
securing both the future payment of rent and the performance of lease
covenants) by looking to either the primary purpose of the deposit'
or the existence of a binding obligation to repay.m
Should the courts focus on the taxpayer's obligation to repay or
the purpose of the deposit? The decisions of the Tax Court and the
circuit courts in City Gas and Indianapolis Power & Light offer no
clear answer. The following discussion examines the theories developed
by each of the courts in these two cases in an effort to explain why
the courts are unable to agree on how customer deposits should be
treated for tax purposes.
III.

AN EVALUATION OF THE PRIMARY PURPOSE AND
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES TESTS

The decisions in City Gas and IndianapolisPower & Light fail to
adequately resolve the controversy surrounding the tax treatment of
utility customer deposits. Both the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit
have criticized the Eleventh Circuit's primary purpose test as a method
which will always require inclusion in income of deposits held to secure
income items.12 In response, the Eleventh Circuit has suggested that
the Tax Court's facts and circumstances approach relies on a number
of factors which should play no role in determining whether payments
received are properly included in gross income.126 Finally, the alternative offered by the Seventh Circuit may place too much reliance on
the payment of interest.2 7

121. Warren Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1940).
122. Mantell v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1143 (1952).
123. Gilken v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 445,454(1948), affd, 176 F.2d 141(6th Cir. 1949).
124. See Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1945); cf. Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968, 969
(5th Cir. 1942) (deposit received subject to binding obligation to account for its ultimate disposition treated as tax-free security deposit).
125. See infra text accompanying notes 144-50.
126. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
127. In its petition for writ of certiorari, the Government noted that the Seventh Circuit's
"heavy reliance on the payment of interest is at odds with the Eleventh Circuit's analysis, since
that court in City Gas had stated that the payment of interest is of little importance in this
context." Government's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Commissioner v. Indianapolis
Power & Light Co., 857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S.Ct. 1929 (1989) (No.
88-1319) (citing City Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 943, 948 n.7 (11th Cir. 1982)).
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While none of these methods adequately resolve the problem, all
have redeeming features which might contribute to the development
of an alternative approach. Consequently, an analysis of the methods
of characterization that the courts used in City Gas and Indianapolis
Power & Light should begin any search for an acceptable method of
classifying customer deposits for federal income tax purposes.
A.

The Primary Purpose Test

The primary purpose test, as applied by the Eleventh Circuit in

City Gas, distinguishes between deposits held as security for the future
payment of income items and those held to secure the performance
of nonincome-producing covenants." This test treats the former as
taxable advance payments and characterizes the latter as tax-free
security.m Should an item be characterized for tax purposes based
solely on its apparent purpose? An examination of the cases in which
courts have used the primary purpose test provides the basis upon
which this approach may be evaluated.
The Tax Court developed the primary purpose test in Gilken.130
The Gilken court faced facts similar to those found in prior rental

deposit cases, but it chose not to apply the reasoning announced in
those cases and instead developed a test that characterized the funds
received based on their primary purpose. 13'

128. City Gas Co., 689 F.2d at 948.
129. See id. at 945-46.
130. See Gilken v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 445 (1948), affd, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1949).
For a review of the facts in Gilken, see supra text accompanying notes 101-09.
131. The Gilken court began by noting that it was faced with a factual situation not unlike
those encountered by the Hirsch Improvement and DeGolia courts. Using these two cases as
a starting point, the Gilken court began by summarizing its understanding of the existing rule:
[Elven though money paid upon the making of a lease is to be held for security
for the performance of the conditions of the lease, if it is also provided that the
payment should be applied as rent for the final period of the lease, and the circumstances under which it was to be repaid might never occur, or there was no
provision for repayment to the lessee, then it is to be considered as income when
received.
Gilken, 10 T.C. at 452. Without explanation, the court chose not to apply this test. Instead, it
focused on the primary purpose of the deposit in an attempt to properly characterize the deposit
received as either prepaid rent or tax-free security. See id. at 453.
Why the Gilken court developed the primary purpose test is unclear. Perhaps the unique
facts in Gilken - a security deposit which could be applied to future rent or to the purchase
price of the property upon exercise of a purchase option - prompted the court to design a rule
that would allow it to isolate the primary purpose and characterize the deposit accordingly.
This does not explain why the court applied the test again in Mantell, an ordinary refundable
deposit case, but it does shed some light on the court's subsequent refusal to apply the primary
purpose test in rental and utility deposit cases not involving purchase options.
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The Tax Court's use of this approach was short-lived. After applying the primary purpose test again in Mantell,132 the court abandoned
the test in J & E Enterprises in favor of a method that characterizes
the funds received based on a review of all the facts and circumstances. 1' It was not until the Eleventh Circuit had occasion to
consider this issue in City Gas that a court again invoked the primary
purpose test to require taxation of deposits on receipt.
The Eleventh Circuit created an opportunity to apply the primary
purpose test in City Gas when it concluded that "where a taxpayer
receives an advance payment for goods or services or other income
items over which the taxpayer has a present right and complete and
unrestricted control, the advance payment constitutes income."13 After
holding that the "present right"1 and "complete and unrestricted control" 13 requirements had been met, the Eleventh Circuit turned its
attention to the purpose of the deposit. In so doing, the court formulated its own version of the primary purpose test: "[If the primary
purpose of the payment is to act as a prepayment for goods and
services, then the amount constitutes taxable income; but if the primary purpose is to secure performance of nonincome-producing covenants or to secure against damage to property, then the payment is
not taxable. ' '137 When the court restated this test later in the opinion,
it replaced the reference to "prepayment for goods and services"
with "prepayment of income items.' ' 18 The distinction that the court
drew between income and nonincome items effectively created two
categories within which any deposit must fal1 39 and, as subsequently

132. Mantell v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1143 (1952) (discussed supra at note 110-14 and
accompanying text). The Tax Court also applied the primary purpose test in Kitchin v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 1738, 1744 (1963), rev'd, 340 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1965).
133. J & E Enters. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 944 (1967). The facts and circumstances approach used by the J & E Enters. court was basically the same as the test
originally described but not adopted by the Tax Court in Gilken. See Gilken, 10 T.C. at 452
(discussed supra at note 131).
134. City Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 943, 945 (11th Cir. 1982), rev'g 74 T.C. 386
(1980).

135. Id. at 946 nn.4 & 10. For a discussion of this portion of the Eleventh Circuit's decision
in City Gas see supra note 31. But cf. City Gas, 74 T.C. at 395 ("Unlike a landlord receiving
advance rentals under a long-term lease, petitioners have no present right to a fixed future
payment.").
136. City Gas Co., 689 F.2d at 946. ("[I]t is undisputed that taxpayers have unrestricted
control over the sums deposited.).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 948.
139.

As the Tax Court noted on remand, "[t]he Eleventh Circuit, as we understand it, did

not admit of the possibility of other categories." City Gas, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 971, 973 (1984).
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recognized by the Seventh Circuit in Indianapolis Power & Light,
resulted in a test which requires immediate taxation of all deposits
140
held to secure income items.
The Eleventh Circuit cited a number of rental deposit cases in

support of its use of the primary purpose test in City Gas.'4 1 The
court properly noted that, while some of these decisions did not specifically mention the primary purpose test, all evaluated the facts and
circumstances surrounding the receipt of the deposit in question in an
attempt to determine the underlying purpose of the payment.'4 Unfortunately, the court failed to justify its decision to differentiate between
income and nonincome items,' 3 and it is this departure from prior law

140. See Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1162, 1166 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1929 (1989). The Seventh Circuit's conclusion is supported by
the way in which the Tax Court applied the primary purpose test on remand in City Gas. See
City Gas, 47 T.C.M. at 971 (discussed supra at notes 36-38 and accompanying text).
141. See City Gas Co., 689 F.2d at 946-47 (citing Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner,
143 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1945); Mantell v. Commissioner,
17 T.C. 1143, 1148 (1952); Gilken v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 445, 454 (1948), affd, 176 F.2d 141
(6th Cir. 1949)). The court also cited a revenue ruling in support of its position. See id. at 946
(citing Rev. Rul. 72-519, 1972-2 C.B. 32).
Noting that the Eleventh Circuit had adopted all decisions rendered by the old Fifth Circuit,
the court also cited three Fifth Circuit decisions, Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner,
128 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942); Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943);
and Van Wagoner v. United States, 368 F.2d 95 (5th Cir. 1966), in support of its use of the
primary purpose test. City Gas Co., 689 F.2d at 946-47. None of these cases endorse the
Eleventh Circuit's more limited position. In fact, the Clinton court permitted the taxpayer to
exclude a deposit from income even though it was held in part as security for the future payment
of rent and would be applied to the lessee's rent obligation in the absence of default. See supra
text accompanying note 81. Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit's modification of existing law
represents its response to a unique situation involving a deposit offered as security for the
payment of future utility bills.
142. City Gas Co., 689 F.2d at 946-47.
143. However, the Eleventh Circuit did illustrate the difference between taxable advance
payments and nontaxable security deposits through the use of examples. The court concluded
that a taxable advance payment is "a sum paid to a lessor at the beginning of a lease which is
to be applied to the rent for a subsequent period, such as the final month or year of the leasehold
. . .," while use of a nontaxable security deposit involves "a lessor [who] requires a lessee to
deposit a sum to secure against damage to the rented premises and agrees to refund the deposit
in full if no such damage occurs." Id. at 946.
The court did not reach a conclusion on the tax treatment of sums held as security for the
payment of income items. Instead, the court remanded the case to the Tax Court with the
following instructions:
If on remand the Tax Court concludes that the primary intent was that the sums
at issue be applied to discharge income items on the final bill (e.g., charges for
gas, turn-on and turn-off and other service charges), the fact that the sums were
labeled as "deposits to secure payment" cannot by itself preclude a finding that
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which undoubtedly has created much of the concern expressed by the
Tax Court and Seventh Circuit in Indianapolis Power & Light.
Although the Seventh Circuit subsequently adopted the primary
purpose test in IndianapolisPower & Light,1' 4 the Tax Court continues
to resist such a move. In IndianapolisPower & Light, the Tax Court
acknowledged the attention that prior courts had given to a deposit's
purpose, but insisted that in those cases the courts placed particular
emphasis on other factors such as taxpayer control over the funds
received and the obligation to pay interest. 145 Consequently, the Tax
Court views '"purpose" as merely one of a number of factors to be
considered in connection with the characterization of customer deposits
for tax purposes.
The Tax Court's reluctance to apply the primary purpose test may
be based on a concern first noted by the court on remand in City
Gas'4 and later highlighted by the Seventh Circuit in Indianapolis
Power & Light: as used by the Eleventh Circuit in City Gas, the
primary purpose test will always treat deposits held as security for
the future payment of income items as taxable advance payments. 147

the sums were intended as prepayments. Although several courts have mentioned
the "security" label as one factor,... we have found no case which would support
a finding for the taxpayer where sums labeled as a "deposit" or "security" were
subject to the unrestricted control of a taxpayer with a present right thereto and
were intended to be applied against income items. The case law requiring a finding
for the Commissioner under such circumstances ... is based, we think, upon the
unarticulated rationale that under such circumstances the sums are in substance
prepayments.
Id. at 948 n.7 (citations omitted). On remand, the Tax Court cited this language in support of
its conclusion that the Eleventh Circuit had recognized only two categories - taxable advance
payment and nontaxable security deposit - and that a deposit must fall into one or the other.
City Gas, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 973 n.4.
144. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. Commissioner, 857 F.2d 1162, 1167 (7th Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1929 (1989). In adopting the Eleventh Circuit's approach, the Seventh
Circuit said,
[a]lthough we believe that the proper approach to determining the appropriate tax
treatment of a customer deposit is to look at the primary purpose of the deposit
based on all the facts and circumstances, we conclude that the application of this
test does not require a finding that a deposit to secure an income payment must
always be taxed as an advance payment.
Id.
145. Id. at 976.
146. See also supra note 38.
147. IndianapolisPower & Light, 857 F.2d at 1166. The Seventh Circuit made some observations about the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit in City Gas:
In stating the test in this manner, the Eleventh Circuit implicitly assumed that a
deposit to secure the payment of an income item is the same as the prepayment
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In blurring the distinction between prepaid income and deposits held
to secure income items, the Eleventh Circuit effectively prevented
the evaluation of other factors on which the Tax Court had relied in

deposit cases to justify its conclusions. 14
The alternative offered by the Seventh Circuit in Indianapolis
Power & Light, which focuses both on the purpose of the deposit and
on the obligation to pay interest, provides a more flexible method of
characterizing customer deposits for tax purposes. However, it is unlikely that this modification of the primary purpose test will be enough
to obtain the Tax Court's endorsement. That court has taken the
position that the payment of interest, while important, is not determinative in classifications of deposits for tax purposes. 149 Consequently,
the Tax Court will continue to evaluate all relevant facts and circumstances when characterizing customer deposits for tax purposes. 1r°

of that income item. Under this test, a sum given primarily to secure the performance of an income producing covenant is taxed as an advance payment. Underlying
this view is the recognition that in terms of the recipient's cash flow, deposits to
secure income items and advance payments are essentially the same.
Id. at 1166 (citations omitted).
The court agreed with the Commissioner that the basic difference between the prepayment of
an income item and the posting of a deposit to secure future payment of that item - the
obligation to refund the deposit - should not necessarily control the result obtained for tax
purposes. However, it did not agree that ignoring the existence of the obligation to repay
explained the difference in treatment proposed by the Commissioner for deposits securing income
items and those securing property. The court explained that
[b]y overlooking the lessor's legal obligations and focusing on "the economic substance of the transaction," . . the IRS fails in our view to persuasively explain
why deposits to secure income should be treated differently from deposits to secure
property that are given in conjunction with a contractual arrangement that generates an income stream (which the IRS concedes should not be included in a taxpayer's gross income upon receipt). A lessor who requires a deposit to secure
against damage to leased property also has use of the deposit amount during the
If the
lease term. If no damage occurs, the money is returned to the lessee ....
property is damaged by the lessee, the deposit is applied to the cost of repairs.
In either case, however, the lessor holds the sum, usually with total discretion as
to its use, during the period the property is in the lessee's possession. In terms
of cash flow to the lessor, a deposit to secure property is at least as advantageous
as a deposit to secure the payment of rent.
Id. at 1167 n.9.
148. For a discussion of the factors evaluated by the Tax Court when characterizing utility
customer deposits, see infra text accompanying notes 151-75.
149. City Gas, 74 T.C. at 392 n.7 (1980).
150. The Supreme Court's decision in IndianapolisPower & Light may not require a change
in the Tax Court's approach to security deposits. The Seventh Circuit's adoption of the primary
purpose test arguably resolved the dispute between circuits over which test to use. In the

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol41/iss4/3

20

Prescott: Customer Deposits: Tax-Free Security or Prepaid Income?
CUSTOMER DEPOSITS

B.

The Facts and Circumstances Test

Most courts which have addressed the tax treatment of deposits
have based their decisions on a review of the facts and circumstances
surrounding the taxpayer's receipt of funds. Indeed, many of the cur-

rent guidelines used by the Tax Court in evaluating utility customer
deposits come from early rental deposit cases. In these cases, the
courts have considered factors such as the payment of interest and
taxpayer control over ultimate disposition of the deposit when charac-

terizing a deposit as either taxable income or tax-free security. 151
Initially, the Tax Court refused to engage in a review of all the
relevant facts and circumstances in determining the tax treatment of
rental deposits. Instead, it decided Gilken by applying a new test
which focused on the intended purpose of the deposit. The Tax Court

later abandoned this "primary purpose test" in favor of a facts and
circumstances approach, a move which has allowed the court to concentrate on those facts unique to utility companies in determining the
tax consequences associated with the receipt of utility customer deposits. In City Gas, for example, the Tax Court used this approach

to highlight the importance of the taxpayer's repayment obligation
and to treat the purpose of the deposit as merely one factor to be

considered when courts evaluate the taxpayer's ability to control the

ultimate disposition of the deposit. 152 Similarly, in IndianapolisPower
& Light the court used this method to emphasize the significance of

the small percentage of customers required to make deposits.'5 In
light of the Eleventh Circuit's adoption of the primary purpose test

absence of such a dispute, the Supreme Court need not choose between the two tests when it
considers the government's appeal in IndianapolisPower & Light.
Because other circuits have yet to pass on this issue, future tax court cases appealable to
circuits other than the Seventh and Eleventh likely will be decided by applying the Tax Court's
facts and circumstances test, while the primary purpose test will be used in cases appealable to
the Seventh or Eleventh Circuits in compliance with the Tax Court's decision in Golsen v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), affd on other grounds, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 940 (1971). Compare American Tel. & Tel. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 16
(1988) (facts and circumstances test used in case appealable to the Second Circuit) with Gas
Light Co. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 685 (1986) (primary purpose test applied in case
appealable to the Eleventh Circuit).
151. The Tax Court has repeatedly emphasized these two factors when characterizing a
deposit for tax purposes. For example, in IndianapolisPower & Light, it observed that "[w]here
the taxpayer has virtually unrestricted control over the amount deposited and does not pay
interest on such amount, the amount has been considered an advance payment of income."
IndianapolisPower & Light, 88 T.C. at 976.
152. City Gas, 74 T.C. at 394.
153. Indianapolis Power & Light, 88 T.C. at 976-77.
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in City Gas and the conclusions reached by the Tax Court on remand, 154
it seems clear that these peculiar factors - all of which strongly
suggest that the funds received remain the property of the depositor
- would play no role in the classification process administered by a
court using the primary purpose test. 1
When characterizing deposits for tax purposes, the courts have
considered a number of factors. Some of the more significant or controversial deserve special attention.
1. Interest
The obligation to pay interest on deposits, much like a borrower's
duty to pay interest on a loan, strengthens the case for an underlying
obligation to repay. For this reason, the decisions in many of the early
rental deposit cases hinged on the presence or absence of an obligation
to pay interest.156 In more recent cases, however, some courts have

154. In City Gas, the Tax Court made the following conclusions on remand:
The most significant item by far on most customers' final bills was the charge for
gas consumed, and a deposit was typically applied as a credit against that charge.
Charges for damage to meters and other nonincome items did not make up a
significant portion of the total final charges. The only reasonable inference is that
the deposits received from customers when service was begun were expected and
intended in most cases to be applied eventually to the charges for gas consumed.
Because that was the primary purpose of the deposits, they were, under the
standard enunciated by the Eleventh Circuit, taxable income.

City Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 971, 973 (1984). In Indianapolis Power &
Light, deposits were often refunded after creditworthiness was established. Consequently, the
approach mandated by the Eleventh Circuit in City Gas and followed by the Tax Court on
remand, as set forth above, would have yielded a different result if the IndianapolisPower &
Light court had concluded that deposits were "typically" applied as a credit against customers'
final bills. Presumably, the percentage of total deposits refunded prior to termination of service
would have influenced the conclusion the court reached on this issue.
155. The Eleventh Circuit actually described the primary purpose test as a test which
evaluates the purpose of a deposit based on all the circumstances. City Gas Co., 689 F.2d at
948. In practice, however, the test identifies "purpose" as the most important factor. For
example, in Gas Light Co. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 685 (1986), the Tax Court
characterized customer deposits as prepaid income based on their primary purpose, even though
other factors, including the percentage of customers required to post deposits and the short
time period within which deposits were required to be refunded, suggested a different result.
156. See, e.g., Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1943) (noninterestbearing deposits held taxable); Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968 (5th
Cir. 1942) (interest-bearing deposits held nontaxable). Although the payment of interest was a
significant factor in many of these cases, it did not assure tax-free treatment. For example, in
United States v. Williams, 395 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1968), the court treated deposits as taxable
advance payments even though interest was paid on the money deposited. Id. at 511; see also
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questioned the significance of interest payments. In City Gas, both
the Tax Court and the Eleventh Circuit placed little emphasis on the
taxpayer's obligation to pay interest. 157 The Seventh Circuit took a
far different approach in IndianapolisPower & Light when it focused
exclusively on the payment of interest and its effect on the taxpayer's
use of the funds received. 15 Although historically the government has
treated interest as one of many factors warranting consideration,159
the emphasis placed on interest payments in IndianapolisPower &
Light has prompted the Commissioner to challenge the relevance of
interest payments by suggesting that interest is merely "compensation
for the advance payment of income items.160
2. Consistent Treatment for Tax and Accounting Purposes
The taxpayers in City Gas and IndianapolisPower & Light were
required to treat customer deposits as current liabilities for financial
reporting purposes. The Tax Court's conclusion in each case was influenced by the manner in which the taxpayers had classified deposits
for accounting purposes. 61 The Eleventh Circuit criticized this approach during its review of City Gas by properly noting that although

Commissioner v. Lyon, 97 F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1938). Similarly, the presence of an obligation to
pay interest was not required in one case for a decision favoring the exclusion of deposits from
income. See Growers Credit Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 981, 997 (1960).
157. While the Tax Court treated the payment of interest by City Gas as a "positive factor,"
it indicated that the nonpayment of interest by City Gas subsidiaries was not a dispositive factor
requiring inclusion of deposits in income. City Gas, 74 T.C. at 392 n.7. On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit agreed that payment of interest was an insignificant factor:
[While the payment of interest might have significance under some circumstances,
we doubt the importance of interest payments in this case. Although some courts
have said that payment of interest is a factor suggestive of a nontaxable deposit,
other courts have recognized that interest may reflect compensation for the advance
payment of income items as well. Therefore, the Tax Court properly placed little
emphasis on whether or not interest was paid in this case.
City Gas Co., 689 F.2d at 948 n.7 (citations omitted).
158. See Indianapolis Power & Light, 857 F.2d at 1168. The court's decision to focus on
the taxpayer's use of the funds received by dividing "use" into two parts - use for investment
purposes and use as security - places particular emphasis on the payment of interest. See id.
The result reached in Indianapolis Power & Light suggests that the payment of a reasonable
rate of interest on customer deposits will all but eliminate the taxpayer's ability to "use" the
deposit as anything other than security and will thereby ensure tax-free treatment. See id. at
1168-69.
159. See Rev. Rul. 72-519, 1972-2 C.B. 32.
160. Government's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power
& Light Co., 857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1929 (1989) (No. 88-1319).
161. See IndianapolisPower & Light, 88 T.C. at 978; City Gas, 74 T.C. at 392.
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a taxpayer is free to select any approved method of accounting for
tax purposes, the method selected must clearly reflect income.162 The
Eleventh Circuit's approach undoubtedly influenced the Tax Court's
decision to place little emphasis on this factor in its Indianapolis
Power & Light opinion. However, subsequently decided Tax Court
cases indicate that the court has not yet abandoned its focus on the
treatment that deposits receive for financial reporting purposes.163
3.

Obligation to Account for Deposit

Until recently, courts treated the existence of an obligation to
repay as adequate justification for excluding deposits from income.16
Many rental deposit cases were decided based on the presence or
absence of a binding refund obligation; the courts reasoned that such
an obligation should receive treatment similar to that enjoyed by the
proceeds of a loan.'6 Although the Tax Court extended this line of
reasoning to utility deposit cases in City Gas and IndianapolisPower
& Light by emphasizing the existence of repayment obligations,'- it
failed to discuss a more fundamental issue: whether the taxpayer's
agreement to repay represented a bona fide obligation worthy of the
treatment received. This question is explored in the final part of this
article.
4. Unrestricted Use and Control
Recipients have had unrestricted use of deposited funds in all utility
and rental deposit cases considered by the courts,167 but the level of

162. City Gas Co., 689 F.2d at 949 (citing Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1,
15 (1974)); see also I.R.C. § 446(b) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1987).
163. See Oak Indus. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1556, 1561 (1987) (treatment of
deposits as prepaid income for financial accounting purposes held relevant to determination of
primary purpose of deposits). Compare American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M.
(CCH) 16, 21 (1988) (regulatory and financial accounting practices held relevant to a determination
of the tax treatment of customer deposits) with Gas Light Co. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M.
(CCH) 685, 691 (1986) (relevance of accounting practices rejected in case appealable to the
Eleventh Circuit, given the circuit court's earlier rejection of the same theory in City Gas).
164. See Warren Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 723, 724 (2d Cir. 1940); Mantell
v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1143, 1148 (1952); cf. Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143
F.2d 912 (2d Cir.) (existence of contingent repayment obligation insufficient to support tax-free
treatment), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1944).
165. See, e.g., Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968, 970 (5th Cir.
1942).
166. See IndianapolisPower & Light, 88 T.C. at 978; City Gas, 74 T.C. at 392-93.
167. As the Second Circuit recognized in Hirsch Improvement, deposits are not taxable on
receipt if they are received subject to a requirement that they be segregated from the recipient's
general funds. Hirsch Improvement, 143 F.2d at 915. The courts have not speculated on the
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control exercisable over deposits has varied. Without explanation,
most courts have taken the position that unrestricted control over the
ultimate disposition of deposits justifies immediate taxation.lc While
the Tax Court used this line of reasoning in J & E Enterprises,169 it
found ways to avoid its application in City Gas and IndianapolisPower
& Light,170 presumably because other factors suggested a different
result. Thus, the extent to which courts will rely on taxpayer control
when determining the tax consequences of a deposit remains unclear. 17
5. Other Factors
The courts also have used other factors, including the ultimate
escheat of unclaimed deposits, 172 the relationship between deposits and
the obligation to pay rent,'7 and the percentage of customers required
to make deposits, 7 4 as a means of classifying deposits for tax purposes.
However, no combination of factors has proven a safe harbor for
taxpayers who seek to exclude deposits from income.effect of a similar restriction on use, but presumably deposits subject to such a restriction would
receive similar treatment - the recipient's lack of complete control would justify exclusion from
income. See, e.g., Oak Indus., 52 T.C.M. at 1562 (suggesting that state regulations restricting
use of customer deposits influenced the Tax Court's decision in City Gas).
168. See, e.g., Van Wagoner v. United States, 368 F.2d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1966); Astor Holding
Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 47, 48 (5th Cir. 1943); Oak Indus., 52 T.C.M. at 1562; see also J
& E Enters. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 944 (1967) (taxpayer's exclusive control over
method of repayment a significant factor); cf. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 55
T.C.M. (CCH) 16, 20 (1988) ("The fact that the customer retained significant control over when
and how the money ... was refunded... indicates that the money was not an advance payment
of income.").
169. See J & E Enters., 26 T.C.M. at 945-46.
170. In City Gas, the Tax Court relied on the taxpayers' unconditional obligation to repay
and the eventual escheat of unclaimed deposits to the state to support its conclusion that City
Gas and its subsidiaries did not have unrestricted control over deposits received. City Gas, 74
T.C. at 394. The Indianapolis Power & Light court reached a similar result by holding that
the taxpayer could only control the disposition of a deposit when the customer failed to pay its
utility bills. See IndianapolisPower & Light, 88 T.C. at 977.
171. Control over the ultimate disposition of deposits is a factor considered in characterizations of other deposits as well. For example, the Internal Revenue Service has ruled that deposits
held by a funeral home were actually the property of its customers, given the control retained
by customers over ultimate disposition of the deposits. See Rev. Rul. 87-127, 1987-2 C.B. 157.
172. See IndianapolisPower & Light, 88 T.C. at 977; City Gas, 74 T.C. at 392-93.
173. See supra note 114.
174. See American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 16, 17 (1988) (six
percent of all customers required to make deposits); Indianapolis Power & Light, 88 T.C. at
966 (five percent of all customers required to post deposits); cf. Gas Light Co. v. Commissioner,
51 T.C.M. 685, 686 (1986) (customer deposits treated as prepaid income even though only
two-fifths of all customers were required to make deposits).
175. One court has suggested that segregation of deposits from the recipient's other funds
will ensure tax-free treatment, at least for as long as the funds are segregated. See Hirsch
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In its most recent attack on the Tax Court's facts and circumstances
test, the government suggests that this approach 'introduces uncertainty into the treatment of customer utility deposits" and "is much
too amorphous and imprecise to provide an acceptable level of predictability for tax planning. '" 7 While there is some truth in these statements, they do not justify rejection of a test which has a proven
record of success and offers a more comprehensive approach to the
characterization of deposits held as security for the future payment
of income. 1'

IV.

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES AND A PROPOSED SOLUTION

Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code requires each taxpayer
to include in gross income all income from whatever source derived.
Gross income for any given year includes advance payments of income, 17s but does not include security deposits received. 9 Should the
courts treat a "deposit" that secures the future payment of an income

Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
750 (1944). The courts have held that the claim-of-right doctrine may not be used to characterize
funds held in formal escrow or other restrictive accounts as income since they do not represent
income "held" under claim of right. See, e.g., Mutual Tel. Co. v. United States, 204 F.2d 160,
161 (9th Cir. 1953). This reasoning suggests that customer deposits which are segregated from
other funds and are restricted as to use should receive similar treatment.
The courts have suggested that any initial characterization of receipts in this manner would
not prevent a subsequent change in circumstances from triggering taxation of funds previously
characterized as tax-free. See, e.g., Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 47, 48 (5th
Cir. 1943) ("If an amount is deposited with a lessor merely as security for the performance of
covenants,... it is not treated as taxable income unless and until something happens to make
the deposit, or a portion of it, the property of the lessor.") (emphasis added); accord Gilken v.
Commissioner, 10 T.C. 445, 451 (1943), affd, 176 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1949); see also Boyce v.
Commissioner, 405 F.2d 526, 530-31 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (removal of condemnation proceeds from
escrow triggered taxation).
176. Government's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13-14, Commissioner v. Indianapolis
Power & Light Co., 857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1929 (1989) (No.
88-1319).
177. Interestingly, the courts also have adopted a facts and circumstances approach to the
characterization of loans for tax purposes. See, e.g., John Kelly Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S.
521, 526 (1946); Haber v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 255, 266 (1969), affd per curiam, 422 F.2d
198 (5th Cir. 1970). Because the existence of an obligation to repay is essential to the tax-free
characterization of both loans and deposits, use of the facts and circumstances approach in loan
cases offers support for application of the test in deposit cases.
178. See, e.g., Schude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Auto. Ass'n v.
United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
The Treasury regulations specifically require gross income to reflect the receipt of prepaid rents.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(b) (as amended 1957).
179. See, e.g., Mantell v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1143 (1952).
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item as a taxable advance payment8 or a nontaxable security deposit?
The following discussion examines alternative theories and concludes
with a proposal for future treatment of deposits which secure income
items.
A.

Claim-of-Right Doctrine

Utility and rental deposit cases typically involve a taxpayer that
receives cash pursuant to an agreement that places no restriction on
the taxpayer's use of the funds received. Thus, it is not surprising
that the claim-of-right doctrine, a theory developed in response to the
unrestricted use of funds received, would be considered as a method
of characterizing deposits for tax purposes.
The Supreme Court developed the claim-of-right doctrine in North
American Oil v. Burnet"', as a means of determining when taxpayers
should recognize income for tax purposes.1 8 The Supreme Court summarized the rule with this frequently quoted language:
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and
without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income which he is required to return, even though it may
still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money,
and even though he may still be adjudged liable to restore
its equivalent. 1 3
Although the Court used the claim-of-right doctrine in North American
Oil to identify the taxable year in which the taxpayer should report
income received, commentators have suggested that the doctrine also
may be viewed as a method for determining whether an amount received is income.8 Although the doctrine was used for this purpose

180.

The Supreme Court cases dealing with the question of prepaid income, see supra note

178, did not consider the receipt of funds subject to an obligation to repay. Consequently,
reliance on this line of cases to support the immediate inclusion of customer deposits in income

would be misplaced.
181.

286 U.S. 417 (1931).

182. For a general discussion of the claim-of-right doctrine, see Dubroff, The Claim of
Right Doctrine, 40 TAX L. REV. 729 (1985).
183. North American Oil, 286 U.S. at 424.
184. See B. BITrKER & L. LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS
6.3.1, at 6-12 (2d ed. 1989) (suggesting that the court's decision in North American Oil

necessarily determined the character of the funds received because it required inclusion of the
amounts in income in an earlier year despite the fact that pending litigation might require a
complete refund of the funds in a later year); cf. S. GERTZIAN, FEDERAL TAX ACCOUNTING
12.03[2][a] (1988) (concluding that the claim-of-right doctrine is only applicable if the funds

received are income).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

27

Florida
Law Review,
Vol. 41, Iss. 4 [1989], Art. 3
FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

in a series of early rental deposit cases,"" more recent decisions suggest
that the courts have yet to agree on whether it is appropriate to
invoke the claim-of-right doctrine in deposit cases. 1w
As noted in many of these cases, a taxpayer must claim the amounts
received as its own to have income under claim of right.8 s Taxpayers
seeking tax-free treatment for deposits make no such claim. Rather,
they contend that deposits received remain the property of the payor
and are held temporarily to secure the performance of covenants set
forth in the agreement between the parties. Because the holder of
deposits does not make the requisite claim of ownership, 18 the claim-ofright doctrine should not be used as a method of characterizing deposits
for tax purposes. 1'
B.

Deposits and the Obligation to Repay

Money or other property received by a taxpayer subject to an

185. See Commissioner v. Lyon, 97 F.2d 70, 73 (9th Cir. 1938); Renwick v. United States,
87 F.2d 123, 124-25 (7th Cir. 1937); United States v. Boston & P. R.R., 37 F.2d 670, 672 (1st

Cir. 1930).
186. Compare Gilken v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 141, 144 (6th Cir. 1949) (use of the claim-ofright doctrine justified since the funds received were not required to be segregated and were
not subject to restrictions on use) and Boyce v. Commissioner, 405 F.2d 526, 531 (Ct. Cl. 1968)
(claim-of-right doctrine used to include appealable condemnation award in income of cash-basis
taxpayer on receipt) with Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968, 969 (5th
Cir. 1942) (doctrine had no application because taxpayer made no claim of ownership to the
deposits received) and Growers Credit Corp. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 981, 998 (1960) (requisite
claim of ownership not made by taxpayer).
187. See Clinton, 128 F.2d at 969; Growers Credit, 33 T.C. at 998; see also United States
v. Merrill, 211 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1954) (taxpayer who renounces all rights in funds upon receipt
and acknowledges an obligation to repay is not required to include such funds in gross income
under claim of right).
188. But what standard does a court apply to the utility company which receives a deposit
subject to an agreement to apply it to the customer's final bill? Although the company does not
claim to have an interest in the deposit received, it clearly has some interest since the customer
is likely to have a balance due upon termination of service. It is unclear in this situation whether
the company's inability to determine its interest in the deposit upon receipt will prevent the
claim-of-right doctrine from triggering income. For a discussion of the nature of the interest
obtained by the recipient of a deposit held to secure payment of customers' future bills, see
infra notes 216-32 and accompanying text.
189. One group of commentators has suggested that, in characterizing of deposits for tax
purposes, the focus should be on two categories of deposits: advance payments and nontaxable
security deposits. Once a deposit is classified as an advance payment, fundamental principles
of tax accounting control recognition of the income for tax purposes. Therefore, application of
the claim-of-right doctrine would not be required. See Burke & Friel, Tax-Free Security:Reflections on IndianapolisPower & Light, 12 REV. TAX'N OF INDIVIDUALS 157, 168 n.57 (1988).
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obligation to repay' 90 is not included in the taxpayer's gross income.191
This treatment is consistent with the Supreme Court's notion of gross
income as any "accession to wealth"; 192 a taxpayer receiving assets
subject to an obligation to repay realizes no increase in net assets
and, therefore, has no accession to wealth.193
Not all obligations to repay are recognized for federal income tax
purposes. The courts generally agree that a liability must be "an
existing, unconditional, and legally enforceable obligation for the payment of a principal sum" to be respected for tax purposes. 19 An obligation to refund a customer deposit, like any other liability, will be
respected for tax purposes if it meets these requirements.
Historically, courts have used a facts and circumstances approach
when determining whether a true debtor-creditor relationship exists. 195
Although use of such a test requires the consideration of a number
of factors,' 96 likelihood of repayment is one of the most important.197

190. Courts also have cited the obligation to expend funds in a manner which will not
benefit the taxpayer as justification for the exclusion of receipts from income. See, e.g., Illinois
Power Co. v. Commissioner, 792 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1986) (funds received subject to the control
of Illinois Utility Commission not taxable); Angelus Funeral Home v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.
391 (1967) (funds collected from prospective customers and held in trust not income); Seven-Up
Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 965, 979 (1950) (taxpayer was a conduit for monies pooled by
distributors to purchase national advertising; identity of funds not destroyed by commingling
funds with the taxpayer's general funds); Cf. Iowa S. Util. Co. v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct.
868 (1987) (power surcharge received from ratepayers subject to refund obligation held income
on receipt because refinds were to be made to all current ratepayers, not just those who were
ratepayers when the surcharge was assessed).
191. Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 319 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
192. See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 430 (1955).
193. See generally B. BriTKER & L. LOKKEN, supranote 184, 6.1, at 6-2 (money or other
property received subject to an obligation to repay does not enrich the recipient and therefore
does not constitute gross income); Popkin, The Taxation of Borrowing, 56 IND. L.J. 43, 46-48
(1980) (discussing the taxation of money or other property received subject to an obligation to
repay).
194. Dri-Power Distribs. Ass'n Trust v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 460, 478 (1970); see also
First Nat'l Co. v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 861 (6th Cir. 1961); Autenreith v. Commissioner,
115 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 1940). For a discussion of the possible significance of the method of
repayment, see infra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., John Kelly Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946); Haber v. Commissioner,
52 T.C. 255 (1969), affd per curiam, 422 F.2d 198 (5th Cir. 1970).
196. In a recent case, the Tax Court observed that "[a]mong the factors which have often
been applied are: (1) whether there is a fixed date for repayment; (2) whether there is a
reasonable expectation of repayment; (3) whether there are notes or other evidences of indebtedness; (4) whether interest is required; (5) whether the creditor makes a demand for payment
once the debtor is in default." Bain v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 800, 802 (1989).
197. See Illinois Power Co. v. Commissioner, 792 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir. 1986) ("usually
the court just asks how likely is repayment, and if the answer is, not very, the receipt is treated
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The Second Circuit acknowledged the critical importance of the likelihood of repayment when it treated rental deposits received by the
taxpayer in Warren Service as tax-free security due to the existence
of a binding obligation to repay. 19 Using the same reasoning, the
Second Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in HirschImprovement
by noting that the rental deposit "was to be repaid under circumstances
which might never occur
......
,,19 While decisions in other rental deposit
cases appear to place little emphasis on the likelihood of repayment,m
courts have based such decisions201 on the presence or absence of
factors frequently considered by courts when determining whether a
debtor-creditor relationship exists. 2° Thus, likelihood of repayment is
a factor courts should evaluate and rely upon to properly characterize
2
deposits for tax purposes. 03
Of course, the existence of an obligation to repay should not be
based solely on the likelihood of repayment.2 4 When characterizing
deposits for tax purposes, the courts have relied on other factors,

as income."); see also Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1945) (presence of contingencies suggested that repayment
was not likely).
198. Warren Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 723, 724 (2d Cir. 1940).
199. Hirsch Improvement, 143 F.2d at 915.
200. See, e.g., J & E Enters. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 944 (1967); Mantell v.
Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1143 (1952); Gilken v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 445 (1948), affd, 176 F.2d
141 (6th Cir. 1949).
201. The presence of other facts in some rental deposit cases made an evaluation of the
likelihood of repayment unnecessary. See, e.g., Astor Holding Co. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d
47 (5th Cir. 1943); Mantell, 17 T.C. at 1143.
202. See, e.g., Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942)
(court focused on the presence of an obligation to pay interest and the variety of items
secured by the deposit, both of which support the likelihood of repayment). In J & E Enters.
and City Gas, however, taxpayer control over ultimate disposition of the deposit determined
the character of the funds received. See City Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. at 394; J & E
Enters., 26 T.C.M. at 946. Query whether the recipient's ability to decide whether to refund
a deposit or apply it in payment of a receivable due from the customer should dictate the
character of the deposit. For a discussion of this issue, see supra notes 167-71 and accompanying
text.
203. Likelihood of repayment is established by the presence of an unconditional obligation
to repay. See, e.g., Warren Serv. Corp. v. Commissioner, 110 F.2d 723, 724 (2d Cir. 1940);
Mantell, 10 T.C. at 1148. This likelihood of repayment test is not met, however, if there is no
provision for refund, see Astor Holding Co., 135 F.2d at 48; J & E Enters., 26 T.C.M. at 946;
Gilken, 10 T.C. at 453; August v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 1165, 1166 (1952), or if deposit refimds
are conditioned on events which may not occur. See Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner,
143 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1945).
204. The Seventh Circuit agreed with this position in Indianapolis Power & Light. See
supra note 147.
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including control over the ultimate disposition of the funds received, 205
the existence of an obligation to pay interest, 2°0 and the length of time
7
during which the recipient is entitled to hold the funds.20 Because the
significance of any one factor may be outweighed by others suggesting
a different result, an evaluation of all relevant facts and circumstances
is necessary to properly determine the existence of an unconditional
obligation to repay.2 0
Once the taxpayer establishes that a repayment obligation exists,
a more difficult question is encountered: Will the method of repayment
affect the tax treatment of the deposit? This problem arises whenever
a deposit agreement permits the recipient to apply the deposit against
a customer's future bills. From the customer's standpoint, there is no
economic difference between a cash refund and a refund made through
a reduction in the customer's bill. Similarly, the recipient realizes no
taxable economic benefit since exercise of its right to offset merely
facilitates payment without the incurrence of collection costs.Y09 Thus,

205. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
207. The fact that customer deposits would be repaid within a fixed and relatively short
period of time suggested to the Tax Court in IndianapolisPower & Light that the deposits
were received subject to an unconditional obligation to repay. See Indianapolis Power & Light
Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 964, 968, 977 (1987), affd, 857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 1929 (1989). The Tax Court reached a similar conclusion in American Tel.
& Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 16, 17 (1988). Cf. Gas Light Co. v. Commissioner,
51 T.C.M. (CCH) 685, 689 (1986) (deposits treated as taxable advance payments despite the
fact that refunds were required to be made after customers had established a record of 24
months of prompt payments). Interestingly, the Tax Court in City Gas was not bothered by
the fact that the taxpayer held customer deposits for an indeterminate period ending with the
termination of service. See City Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 386, 388 (1980), rev'd, 689
F.2d 943 (11th Cir. 1982). The IndianapolisPower & Light court's reliance on the fixed holding
period suggests that likelihood of repayment may not be enough to shelter deposits from income
if the recipient is entitled to hold the deposits for an indeterminate period of time. See Indianapolis Power & Light, 88 T.C. at 977.
208. Cf. Covey v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 1379, 1385 (1969) (citing Ambassador
Apts. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 236, 241 (1968), affd per curiam, 406 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1969)
in support of its reliance on all facts and circumstances when characterizing a note as a bona
fide debt for purposes of the deduction for interest); Dixie Daires Corp. v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 476, 493 (1980) (characterization of corporate advances as either loans or contributions to
capital should be made by reference to all the evidence); Rev. Rul. 79-229, 1979-2 C.B. 210,
211 (facts and circumstances approach used to characterize expenditure as either deposit or
deductible expense).
209. See Indianapolis Power & Light, 857 F.2d at 1169 ('The deposit merely assures that
IPL [Indianapolis Power & Light] will be paid and minimizes the collection costs IPL would
otherwise incur if the depositor defaults, functions typically associated with security deposits.").
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the manner in which the taxpayer may refund a deposit should not
influence the deposit's characterization as a tax-free obligation to
210
repay.
Is proof of a binding obligation to repay enough to shelter customer
deposits from taxation? In most situations, an unconditional obligation
to refund a customer deposit will prevent it from being taxed. However, as discussed below, the receipt of deposits held as security for
the future payment of income items may provide the recipient with
an economic benefit that should be taxed notwithstanding the existence
of a binding obligation to repay.
C.

Economic-Benefit Doctrine

As noted above, the concept of gross income is grounded on the
principle of "accession to wealth. ' '11 The receipt of a deposit subject
to an unconditional obligation to repay ordinarily does not result in
an accession to wealth. However, it has been suggested that a utility
company that holds such a deposit to ensure payment of future bills
receives an economic benefit that in many cases should be treated as
an accession to wealth for purposes of the income tax.
A utility company that receives a deposit as security for the payment of future utility bills has the use of the customer's money for
as long as the account remains active. Additionally, the company is
assured that the customer's final bill will be paid because it may either
withhold the deposit refund until the customer makes payment or
apply the deposit to the final bill. The current receipt of money,
together with the guaranteed receipt of income in the future, is argu-

210. See American Tel. & Tel. v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 16, 21 (1988) (court
concluded that taxpayer merely exercised right of setoff to avoid expense of writing additional
checks). In City Gas, the taxpayers collected deposits which they could elect to apply toward
payment of a customer's final bill. City Gas, 74 T.C. at 388-89. The Tax Court concluded that
these customer deposits were unconditionally subject to refund even though the companies
usually applied deposits against final bills rather than refunding them to customers upon receipt
of payment. Id. at 390, 394. Although courts have distinguished between these two situations
in the past, see, e.g., Mantell v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1143, 1148 (1952), some argue that
there is no difference between the two. Cf. August v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1165, 1169 (1952)
(payment of rent and simultaneous issuance of deposit refund check collapsed by court into
single transaction; deposit treated as taxable advance payment); see generally Burke & Friel,
at 167-68 ('There seems little substantive difference between a deposit that may be applied to

reduce future rents and a deposit that must be returned at once the future rent has been paid.").
The Seventh Circuit rejected this "substance over form" argument in Indianapolis Power &
Light. See IndianapolisPower & Light, 857 F.2d at 1167 n.9.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 192-93.
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ably the same as the prepayment of that future income. 212 Both the
Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit rejected this "substance over form"
theory in Indianapolis Power & Light,2 3 but the courts failed to
adequately explain their reluctance to adopt this approach . 214 Consequently, the government has advanced this position in its petition
for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.2 1 5
Beyond this argument of substance over form, however, lies
another theory which is perhaps more fundamental in its approach.
This theory suggests that the presence of an economic benefit - the
current use of the funds together with the assured receipt of future
income - is enough to justify current inclusion of the customer deposit
in gross income. Although traditionally the concept of gross income
has not focused on the receipt of an economic benefit, 216 Reed v. Commissioner,217 a recent case from the First Circuit, suggests that
economic benefit is an accurate means of identifying items of gross
income. In that case, the court held that "an individual should be
taxed on any economic benefit conferred on him to'218 the extent that
the benefit has an ascertainable fair market value.
219
This approach, which was first advocated in a recent article,
would isolate deposits that secure items of income and treat them as
income in the year of receipt despite the existence of a binding obligation to repay. If the customer ultimately paid the bill, the taxpayer

212. As discussed in note 180, supra, Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); and Automobile Club v. Commissioner,
353 U.S. 180 (1957), the 'trilogy" cited most often in support of the recognition of prepaid
income, would not support this "substance over form" argument because those cases did not
involve the receipt of deposits subject to an obligation to repay.
213. See Indianapolis Power & Light v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 964, 976 (1987), affd, 857
F.2d 1162, 1169 (7th Cir. 1988).
214. The Tax Court rejected this theory by drawing different conclusions from the cases
cited by the Commissioner. See Indianapolis Power & Light, 88 T.C. at 975-76. The Seventh
Circuit concluded that "(alithough the recipient is assured that a customer's outstanding bill
will be paid, this benefit alone in our view does not constitute "the use" of the proceeds in a
manner sufficient to justify immediate taxation of the deposit." IndianapolisPower & Light,
857 F.2d at 1169.
215. Government's petition for writ of certiorari at 12, Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power
& Light Co., 857 F.2d 1162 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 1929 (1989) (No. 88-1319).
216. Historically, the economic-benefit doctrine has been used only to determine when
deferred compensation should be included in an employee's gross income. See Sproull v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 244, 247-48 (1951), affd per curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952); Rev. Rul.
60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, 179-80 (Situation 4).
217. 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983).
218. Id. at 147.
219. See Burke & Friel, supra note 189, at 173-75.
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would be entitled to a deduction for the amount of the deposit subsequently refunded. 220 If the taxpayer applied the deposit in payment
of the customer's final bill, it would charge the customer for the unpaid
balance and recognize the resulting increase in income at that time.2 1
The recipient of a deposit held to secure future income has no
accession to wealth, and therefore no income, provided the deposit is
received subject to a valid obligation to repay. Yet this recipient
appears to have improved its economic situation by enhancing its cash
position and assuring the receipt of future income. If the recipient's
right to apply deposits against future income is not considered a valid
means of repayment as some courts have suggested,2 the economic
benefit represented by the receipt of cash and assurance of future
income would constitute an accession to wealth.2
But exactly what benefit does the taxpayer realize in this scenario?
The cash method taxpayer receives a benefit in the form of guaranteed
recognition of income,2 while the accrual-method taxpayer is assured
that no future loss will be incurred if the account later proves uncollectible. 226 According to proponents of the economic-benefit doctrine,

220. City Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 971, 974 (1988). However, this
deduction would not trigger an adjustment under I.R.C. § 1341(a) because the deduction taken
for refunds made would not have been taken with respect to an erroneous inclusion in income
in an earlier year, as required by I.R.C. § 1341(a)(2) (1986).
221. This presumes the taxpayer is using the accrual method of accounting for tax purposes.
See I.R.C. § 446(c)(2) (1986); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1987).
222. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. For example, if a $100 deposit is received
subject to an obligation to return $100 in the future, the increase in assets due to the receipt
of cash is offset by an increase in liabilities, and no accession to wealth has been realized.
However, if the taxpayer assumes no obligation to repay, or if the obligation assumed is not
respected for tax purposes, the increase in assets is not offset by an increase in liabilities, and
the resulting increase in equity constitutes a taxable accession to wealth. In this situation,
temporary deferral would be available under Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(c) (as amended in 1985);
Gas Light Co. v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 685, 692-93 (1986); City Gas, 47 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 975.
223. See, e.g., Hirsch Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 912, 915 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 750 (1945); J & E Enters. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 944, 946
(1967).
224. Cf. B. BrrrKER & L. LOKKEN, supranote 184, 6.1, at 6-2 (discussed supraat note
193). See also supra note 222.
225. I.R.C. § 451(a) (1986); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1987); 1.451-1(a)
(as amended in 1978).
226. The receipt of cash does not ordinarily dictate when income is recognized for tax
purposes under the accrual method of accounting. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (as amended
in 1987). Consequently, the receipt of a deposit held to secure the payment of accrued income
serves only to assure the taxpayer that later collection problems will not result in the recognition
of an offsetting loss.
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taxpayers realizing such benefits should characterize deposits received
as advance payments of income.2
Advance payments of income are taxable to the recipient upon
receipt under both the cash and accrual methods of accounting. Taxpayers using the cash method of accounting are required to recognize
all items constituting gross income in the year of receipt.2 28 Advance
payments are also taxed on receipt under the accrual method of accounting despite the fact that income is ordinarily recognized when
earned under the all-events test.229 However, this exception to the
all-events test, which was developed by the Supreme Court in a series
of cases known as the trilogy, presumes that the payments received
are items of income.2 30
Unlike the advance payments made in the trilogy cases, customer
deposits held to secure the receipt of income represent future income
only to the extent that they assure the payment of customer bills.
Since the amount of income guaranteed by each deposit cannot be
determined until the customer's bill is prepared,22 1 the trilogy cases

227. See Burke & Friel, supra note 189, at 173-74.
228. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1987).
229. The accrual method of accounting requires that all items of income be recognized in
the year in which "all the events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and
the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy." Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)
(as amended in 1987). The Supreme Court modified this rule in a series of cases known as the
trilogy by requiring accrual method taxpayers to recognize income on receipt, even though the
all-events test had not yet been met. See Schiude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963); American
Auto. Ass'n v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961); Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S.
180 (1957).
230. In each of the cases comprising the trilogy, the taxpayer received deposits which could
be identified as income on receipt. In Schlude, the taxpayer received cash representing fees
for dance lessons which could be taken by the customer on demand. Since the fees were not
refundable in the event the lessons were not taken, it was clear that the payments received
were income on receipt. Sie Schlude, 372 U.S. at 135-36. Similar conclusions were reached by
the Court in American Auto. Ass'n and Automobile Club, both of which involved the receipt
of nonrefundable club fees entitling the paying member to a variety of services upon request.
See American Auto. Ass'n, 367 U.S. at 689-90; Automobile Club, 353 U.S. at 188-90. The ability
to characterize receipts as income is also a prerequisite to taxation under the cash method of
accounting. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1987) (requiring cash-method taxpayers to include income items in gross income on receipt).
2.31. This inability to identify the amount of guaranteed future income distinguishes the
utility deposit cases from the rental deposit cases. The Tax Court recognized this distinction in
City Gas when it observed that "[u]nlike a landlord receiving advance rentals under a long-term
lease, petitioners have no present right to a fixed future payment." City Gas, 74 T.C. at 395
(emphasis added, citations omitted). While the right to a fixed future payment does not arise
in a utility deposit setting until the amount of the customer's future bill is determined, a
landlord's right to future rental payments is usually fixed at the inception of the lease. See,
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do not support the inclusion of customer deposits in income prior to
the time at which the income portion of the deposit can be identified.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the First Circuit's decision in
Reed to limit taxation to those economic benefits having an ascertainable fair market value.2 Because the economic benefit associated with
the receipt of customer deposits held to secure future income cannot
be characterized and valued on receipt, exclusive reliance on the
economic benefit doctrine to characterize deposits as prepaid income
is misplaced.
D.

A Proposed Solution

Any attempt to properly classify a customer deposit for federal
income tax purposes must begin with an evaluation of the relationship
established between the customer and the recipient when the deposit
is received. If a review of all the facts and circumstances2 indicates
that the recipient likely will refund the deposit,2 the parties have
established a debtor-creditor relationship,2 and the deposit should
qualify for the tax-free treatment to which any "loan" is entitled.G
This approach does not, however, address the method of repayment,
a factor which has led some courts to disregard an otherwise valid
obligation to repay.3 7 If the right to offset deposits against customers
bills is not recogni2"'d as a valid means of repayment, the focus must

e.g., J & E Enters. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 944 (1967); Gilkin v. Commissioner, 10
T.C. 445, 451 (1948), affd, 176 F.2d 141, 145 (6th Cir. 1948). Consequently, a deposit offered
to secure the payment of a fixed future obligation to pay rent results in a benefit which is
subject to valuation in the year the deposit is received.
232. See supra text accompanying note 218.
233. See supra note 204-08 and accompanying text.
234. Many of the rental deposit cases did not involve deposits which were received subject
to an obligation to repay. For example, in Gilken, the taxpayer received the rental deposit
subject only to the lessor's obligation to apply it to the last year's rent in the event all other
lease covenants had been performed by the lessee. Gilken, 10 T.C. at 446-47. The courts in
Clinton Hotel Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 128 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1942) and J & E Enters.,
26 T.C.M. (CCH) at 944 considered similar situations. However, in each of those cases the
recipient of the deposit had a duty to account to the lessee for the ultimate disposition of the
deposit. See, e.g., Clinton, 128 F.2d at 969. Since either manner of disposition effects the same
result economically, see supra note 210 and accompanying text, the duty to account for the
disposition of a deposit in this manner should be treated as an obligation to repay for purposes
of this proposal.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 190-208.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 190-93.
237. See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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shift to the economic benefit realized through the receipt of deposits
held to secure future income. s
In evaluating the economic benefit realized by the recipient of
customer deposits, one must first evaluate the underlying purpose of
the deposit.23 9 If the deposit secures the performance of nonincome-producing covenants or secures against damage to property,40 it does not
assure the future receipt of income and, therefore, confers no taxable
economic benefit on its recipient.2 1 However, if the deposit secures
the future payment of income items,2 it does guarantee the receipt
of future income, and taxation of the corresponding economic benefit
2
is justified.

3

A decision on when the recipient must include this economic benefit
in gross income must then be made. Some commentators have
suggested that the mere presence of an economic benefit justifies
taxation of the entire deposit in the year of receiptYm However, this
approach fails to recognize that sometimes the economic benefit is not
subject to valuation until the income item the customer deposit secures
becomes fixed.4 5 In suggesting that realization of an economic benefit
should be the basis for determining gross income, the First Circuit
in Reed properly recognized that valuation of such benefits is a prerequisite to inclusion in income.4 6 If the economic benefit associated
238. See supra text accompanying notes 223-24. The significance of the right of offset as
a valid means of repayment should not be confused with the existence of an obligation to repay.
In the absence of an obligation to refund a customer deposit (either by refunding the deposit
in cash or by offsetting some or all of the deposit against the customer's account balance) the
entire deposit is treated as an advance payment of income. See, e.g., Schiude v. Commissioner,
372 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1963); Hagen Advertising Displays v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1105,
1109-10 (6th Cir. 1969). In contrast, the right to apply deposits in payment of customer bills
merely discounts the obligation to repay; only that portion of each deposit which actually
assures the receipt of future income should be treated as a benefit subject to the income tax.
239. Presumably, the Eleventh Circuit's primary purpose test would be used whenever the
deposit served more than one purpose. See City Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 689 F.2d 943, 946
(l1th Cir. 1982).
240. The Eleventh Circuit was the first to distinguish between income and nonincome-producing covenants. See City Gas Co., 689 F.2d at 946. For a discussion of the court's distinction
between these two types of deposits, see supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
241. See City Gas Co., 689 F.2d at 946.
242. See supra note 240.
243. See supra note 224 and accompanying text.
244. See Burke & Friel, supra note 189, at 174. Presumably, this position is based on the
annual accounting concept, which requires taxable income to be computed on the basis of the
taxpayer's taxable year. See I.R.C. § 441(a) (1986); see also Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.,
282 U.S. 359, 365-66 (1931) (income tax is assessed on income realized during the taxpayer's
annual accounting period rather than on income calculated on a transaction by transaction basis).
245. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
246. See Reed v. Commissioner, 723 F.2d 138 (1st Cir. 1983).
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with the receipt of a deposit cannot be valued at the time of receipt,

taxation of the benefit must be postponed.
The Internal Revenue Code generally requires taxpayers to recognize all items of gross income in the year of receipt. 247 Included among
the numerous exceptions to this general rule2 is a doctrine of judicial
origin that suspends taxation of consideration received until its character can be determined. 2 9 Cases in this area usually involve payments
made in consideration for the receipt of an option to purchase property.
Although the grant of an option often results in the immediate recognition of ordinary income,2 the option holder's future action may
affect the character of the funds received if the sales agreement requires the property owner to apply the option payment against the
purchase price of the property upon exercise of the option.2 1 Under
these circumstances, the courts have held that the taxpayer may postpone recognition until a future event (lapse or exercise of the option)
2
determines the character of the payments received.

The justification for postponing recognition of income in utility
deposit cases is even stronger because, unlike option payments (which
represent income that cannot currently be classified), deposits received
from utility customers may not be income at all. A utility cannot
characterize customer deposits as either future income or refundable

247. I.R.C. § 451(a) (1986). This provision of the Internal Revenue Code anticipates that
different methods of accounting may justify recognition of receipts in a different period. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(2) (as amended in 1985).
248. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1031, 1033-34; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.451-5(c)(1)(i) (1985); cf.
Rev. Proc. 71-21, 1971-2 C.B. 549, 549-50.
249. See, e.g., Kitchin v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1965); Virginia Iron Coal
& Coke Co. v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 630 (1939);
Dill Co. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 196, 200 (1959), affd, 294 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1961).
250. See Virginia Iron Coal & Coke Co., 99 F.2d at 921 (payments received treated as
taxable income rather than return of capital if option to purchase surrendered).
251. For example, in Dill, the taxpayer granted an unrelated company the right to use a
trademark pursuant to a licensing agreement which also provided the user with an option to
purchase the trademark. Dill, 33 T.C. at 196-97. The agreement stated that, upon exercise of
the option, consideration previously paid for any extension of the license prior to purchase would
be applied in reduction of the purchase price. Id. at 199-200. The Third Circuit agreed with the
taxpayer that the monies paid for an extension of the licensing agreement could not be characterized as either ordinary income or capital gain until it was later determined whether the
option to purchase would be exercised. See id. at 300-01.
252. See Kitchin, 340 F.2d at 898-99; Dill, 294 F.2d at 301; Virginia Iron Coal & Coke
Co., 99 F.2d at 921. Cf. Gilken v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 445, 454 (1948) ("we think ... [the
payments] were... primarily intended as rent, and that the applicability upon purchase price
is so secondary as not to require a different conclusion.").
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security until it prepares the customer's final bi.2 Once the utility
company determines the customer's obligation, that portion of the
deposit which assures payment of the obligation can be characterized
as income.2 If the deposit exceeds the amount owed by the customer,
the balance would be characterized as a refundable security deposit
and afforded tax-free treatment.
Consider the result obtained through the use of such an approach.
In City Gas, receipt of customer deposits offered as security for the
future payment of utility bills provided the taxpayers with an economic
benefit not currently susceptible to valuation, but the Tax Court
nevertheless required the taxpayers to include all such deposits in
income in the year of receipt.2 Under the approach proposed above,
taxation of customer deposits would be required due to the economic
benefit realized through the guarantee of future income, but the companies would be permitted to defer recognition of that benefit given
their inability to identify the income portion of each deposit prior to
preparation of customers' final bills. As noted above, this conclusion
would be predicated on the existence of a binding obligation to repay.25
In Indianapolis Power & Light, the taxpayer realized a similar
economic benefit through the receipt of customer deposits held to
secure the payment of future utility bills. The obligation to account
for the ultimate use of the deposit, the relatively short holding period,
and other factors mentioned by the Tax Court and the Seventh Circuit2 7 support the existence of an unconditional obligation to repay.
Since the benefit that the taxpayer realized was not currently subject
to valuation, the proposed approach would defer characterization of
customer deposits until the taxpayer either refunded the deposit or
applied it in payment of a particular bill.
253. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. Preparation of the customer's final bill
could be considered a change in circumstances warranting a reevaluation of the deposit's tax-free
status, as contemplated by the courts in some of the early rental deposit cases. See supra note
175.
254. This assumes that the receipt of income is guaranteed either by applying the deposit
to the customer's account or by retaining the deposit pending receipt of payment from the
customer. See supra note 210.
255. See City Gas, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) at 973.
256. Payment of interest on deposits, the duty to account for the ultimate disposition of
deposits, and escheat of all unclaimed deposits are all factors supporting the conclusion that the
companies in City Gas established a debtor-creditor relationship with customers when deposits
were collected. See City Gas, 74 T.C. at 392. Although deposits were held by the companies
for an indeterminate length of time, it is unlikely that this factor would require a different
conclusion. See supra note 207. In the absence of an obligation to repay, each deposit would be
taxed in its entirety on receipt. See supra notes 178 & 180 and accompanying text.
257. For a discussion of the relevant factors relied upon by the courts, see supra text
accompanying notes 54-71.
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CONCLUSION

Should customer deposits be considered tax-free security or prepaid
income? Although the courts initially considered this question in a
series of rental deposit cases,2 s debate over the proper tax treatment
of customer deposits really began with the Tax Court's decision in
City Gas. That decision prompted the courts to reexamine the way
in which deposits are characterized for tax purposes, and it eventually
led to the development of a number of characterization methods, none
of which adequately resolves the problem posed by a utility company's
receipt of deposits held to secure future income items.
The Tax Court, when characterizing deposits for tax purposes,
applies a facts and circumstances approach.' 9 The Eleventh Circuit
rejected this method and instead adopted a test that focuses on the
primary purpose of the deposit.2 Most recently, the Seventh Circuit
endorsed an approach that evaluates both the purpose of the deposit
and other relevant factors, but places particular emphasis on the obligation to pay interest.2 6' Each of these methods has merit, but all
fail to adequately address the underlying economic benefit realized
from the receipt of a deposit held to secure future income.
The solution proposed above recognizes that deposits received as
security for the future payment of customer bills provide the recipient
with an economic benefit that ultimately should be included in gross
income. If the recipient has an unconditional obligation to account for
the disposition of the deposit, it should include in gross income that
portion of the deposit which guarantees the receipt of future income,
but not until the resulting economic benefit can be valued. In deferring
characterization of deposits, this method ensures that the benefit eventually taxed is an accurate measure of the income actually realized by
the recipient. +

258.
259.
260.
261.

See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying notes 74-124.
supra note 150 and accompanying text.
supra text accompanying note 137.
supratext accompanying notes 58-69.

+Editor'sNote: In a unanimous decision issued on January 9, 1990, the Supreme Court concluded that deposits received by the taxpayer in IndianapolisPower & Light did not constitute

taxable income on receipt. The existence of an unconditional obligation to repay and customers'
retention of control over the manner of repayment were cited by the Court in support of its
decision.
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